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In Defense of Specialized Theft Statutes

DAVID GRAY & CHELS EA JONES 

INTRODUCTION

S

tuart Green has done us a great favor in Thirteen Ways to Steal a
Bicycle1—well, several really—by documenting our current views on
theft; putting them in historical and philosophical perspective; and
launching a deep and sophisticated critique of two prominent, and
somewhat paradoxical, features of contemporary theft law: the
consolidation of common law theft crimes 2 and the proliferation of
specialized theft statutes.3 As Green points out, the modern trend of theft
laws in the United States, particularly since the American Law Institute
adopted Herbert Weschler’s draft of the Model Penal Code4 in 1962, has
 Associate Professor, University of Maryland, Francis King Carey S chool of Law.
  University of Maryland, Francis King Carey S chool of Law.
1 S TUART P. G REEN, T HIRTEEN WAYS TO S TEAL A B ICYCLE : T HEFT L AW IN THE INFORMATION
A GE (2012).
2 Green describes three major points of criticism that led to a complete overhaul of theft
law. First, theft law was conceptually too complex and judges, juries, and the public could not
grasp the abstract distinctions between offenses. Id. at 17-18. S econd, loopholes between
offenses allowed defendants to escape conviction on technicalities. Id. at 18. Finally, the
common law distinctions between various theft offenses were thought to serve no legitimate
purpose. Id.
3 Despite the consolidation of common law theft offenses, many states expanded theft laws
by enacting specialized theft statutes. Green notes that the proliferation of “subject-specific”
theft statutes is the result of the growing complexity of substantive criminal law and does not
reflect a deliberate attempt by states to reverse the consequences of consolidation. Id. at 34.
4

Article 223 of the Model Penal Code represented a significant shift in theft law. The
Model Penal Code collapsed distinct common law theft offenses, such as larceny,
embezzlement, false pretense, and extortion, into a single theft offense. M ODEL PENAL CODE §
223.1 introductory note (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). The purpose behind
consolidation was
to avoid procedural problems . . . [such as] a defendant’s claim that he
did not misappropriate the property by the means alleged but in fact
misappropriated the property by some other means and from the
combination of such a claim with the procedural rule that a defendant
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been to eschew the sometimes technical distinctions between common law
crimes like larceny, false pretenses, larceny by trick, embezzlement,
blackmail, and extortion in favor of consolidated theft statues that frame
the offense characteristics in general terms and order severity of
punishment mainly according to the value of goods. 5 One problem with
consolidation, as Green argues, is that it flattens morally important
distinctions between traditional common law theft offenses, leaving a onesize-fits-all scheme that fails to account for differences between either the
method by which a theft is accomplished or the nature of the property
stolen.6
Holding goods and value constant, Green contends that there is a
moral difference between larceny and failing to return misdelivered
property, say, whether one favors a retributivist or consequentialist theory
of punishment.7 Furthermore, as Green’s original empirical study shows,8
these distinctions are reflected in commonly held intuitions about the
relative blameworthiness of various theft strategies. 9 Separately, Green
makes the case for treating the theft of different kinds of property
differently, based principally on the nature of property rights affected.10
Thus, sneaking into a full hall to hear a lecture without paying while others
wait outside unable to get in is morally distinct from sneaking into a halffilled hall.11 That is because taking a seat in the full hall excludes a potential
paying customer, thereby denying the speaker income he or she otherwise
would have had. By contrast, sneaking into the half-filled lecture hall
denies the speaker very little in that the speaker receives the same

who is charged with one offense cannot be convicted by proving another.
Id. § 223.1(b).
5 G REEN, supra note 1, at 23-24.
6 Id. at 30-31.
7 See id. at 169-71.
8 We discuss Professor Green’s study and its implications below. See infra Part III.
9 As the title of the book suggests, Green identifies thirteen main categories of theft
conduct: Receiving stolen property, failing to return misdelivered property, false pretenses,
passing a bad check, looting, embezzlement, larceny, blackmail, robbery, theft by
housebreaking, extortion, and armed robbery. G REEN, supra note 1, at 60-61. To provide some
context for his moral analysis, Green conducted an empirical study in which he asked
participants to assess the comparative seriousness of thefts conducted using each of these
means. Id. at 57-58, 60-62. In order from most to least serious, his respondents generally
agreed on the following list: (1) Armed Robbery; (2) Extortion; (3) Theft by Housebreaking; (4)
S imple Robbery; (5) Blackmail; (6) Larceny; (7) Embezzlement; (8) Looting; (9) Passing a Bad
Check; (10) False Pretenses; (11) Failing to Return Misdelivered Property; and (12) Receiving
S tolen Property. Id. at 62.
10
11

See id. at 6, 75.
Id. at 67-68.
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compensation from paying attendees that he or she otherwise would have
because the “thief’s” conduct does not exclude another paying audience
member from attending.12 Here again, Green’s empirical study supports his
moral views.13 Green therefore argues for abandoning the project of theft
consolidation in favor of adopting statutory structures that give full weight
to differences in the manner of theft, the type of property stolen, and the
nature and degree of both primary interference with property interests and
any secondary harms.14
Principally, because he is so clear in developing his critique of
consolidation, and so comprehensive and persuasive in assembling the
constituents of his normative framework for defining and grading theft
offenses,15 there are many opportunities to quibble with Professor Green
but very little ground for serious disagreement. It is therefore in a spirit of
broad agreement that we will focus our attention here on what we take to
be a paradox of sorts in Professor Green’s intuitions, if not his argument.
Specifically, as Green notes, there is an odd tension in the recent history of
theft law in that an increase in specialized theft laws has accompanied
consolidation.16 Green is of course strongly critical of consolidation, but is
also skeptical of many specialized theft statutes. 17 His skepticism seems to

12 As Green explains, zero -sumness involves a “transfer of property from owner to
offender.” Id. at 210. In other words, “what the thief gains, the victim must lose.” Id. Green
also points out, whether, and to what degree, a good is commodifiable and rivalrous
“determine[s] whether, and in what manner, it is subject to theft.” Id.
13 Green’s study sampled opinions from 172 incoming students at Rutgers S chool of LawNewark to determine whether their “moral intuitions about the blameworthiness of different
forms of theft are consistent with the way in which such offenses are treated under a
consolidated theft regime.” Id. at 55, 57. In the second part of the study, Green asked students
to compare four different scenarios. The scenarios involved the theft of a $50 test preparation
tool in forms ranging from a physical test-preparation book, a downloaded electronic file, a
seat in a test preparation lecture for which the lecture hall had empty seats, and a seat in a
test-preparation lecture for which the lecture hall had no empty seats. Id. at 66. Fifty-six
percent of participants said that stealing a physical book was more blameworthy than stealing
an electronic copy; forty-one percent said there was no difference between the two. Id. at 67.
S ixty-seven percent of students reported stealing a physical book as more blameworthy than
stealing a seat in a filled lecture hall, while twenty -two percent viewed no difference between
the two. Id. S tealing a seat in a filled lecture hall was viewed worse than stealing a seat in a
partially filled hall and in the final scenario, students ranked stealing an electronic book as
more blameworthy than stealing a seat in a partially filled lecture hall. Id.
14

See G REEN, supra note 1, at 270-75.
See id. at 270-76.
16 Id. at 34 (“There is no easy explanation for why such specialization occurred more or less
simultaneously with consolidation.”).
17 See id. at 33-36 (citing the example of Louisiana and that state’s overabundance of
specialized theft laws).
15
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derive principally from a concern that specialized theft statutes are
products of political expediency, or perhaps unconscious recognition of
what has been lost in the process of consolidation, and therefore could do
more harm than good by perpetuating the moral muddle created by
consolidation while also needlessly cluttering up our criminal codes. 18
Although these are weighty concerns, we think that they may be
misplaced, particularly with respect to contemporary laws meant to
confront modern forms of theft, like unauthorized downloading, and laws
that serve to highlight underappreciated norms internal to important social
enterprises, such as retail commerce.19 In the remainder of this essay, we
will therefore attempt to make a case for specialized theft statutes as a
complement to Professor Green’s broader project.
I.

Specialized Theft Statutes

Pennsylvania,20 New Jersey,21 and Colorado22 are just three states of

18

See id. at 34-36.
See, e.g., David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the La w that Saved the Web,
WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008, 3:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/ten-years-later/
(explaining how the specially crafted Digital Millennium Copyright Act provided a successful
remedy to an outdated copyright law and ultimately spurred the creation of new
technological businesses).
19

20 The theft consolidation provision of Pennsylvania’s theft chapter provides , in part,
“[c]onduct denominated theft in this chapter constitutes a single offense. An accusation of
theft may be supported by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft
under this chapter, notwithstanding the specification of a different manner in the complaint or
indictment . . . .” 18 P A. CONS. S TAT. A NN. § 3902 (West 1983). The sub-chapter enumerates
various types of theft, including: theft by unlawful taking or disposition, theft by deception,
theft by extortion, theft of property lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake, receiving stolen
property, and theft of services. See §§ 3921-3925.
21

New Jersey’s theft consolidation provision provides the following:
Conduct denominated theft or computer criminal activity in this chapter
constitutes a single offense, but each episode or transaction may be the
subject of a separate prosecution and conviction. A charge of theft or
computer criminal activity may be supported by evidence that it was
committed in any manner that would be theft or computer criminal
activity under this chapter . . . .

N.J. S TAT. A NN. § 2C:20-2 (West 2013).
22

Colorado’s theft consolidation statute provides the following:
If any law of this state refers to or mentions larceny, stealing,
embezzlement (except embezzlement of public moneys), false pretenses,
confidence games, or shoplifting, that law shall be interpreted as if the
word ‘theft’ were substituted therefor; and in the enactment of sections
18-4-401 to 18-4-403 it is the intent of the general assembly to define one
crime of theft and to incorporate therein such crimes, thereby removing
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many that have consolidated various common law theft offenses into
unitary theft provisions.23 Yet, despite the relative shrinking of their theft
chapters to reflect consolidation, these states maintain an arra y of specialty
statutes that target specific conduct likely covered already under the broad
umbrella of their consolidated theft statutes. For example, in Pennsylvania,
it is a crime to operate an organized retail scheme whereby stolen
merchandise is later converted to money for criminal enterprises.24 In New
Jersey, unlawfully accessing a computer database to defraud a third party
could carry a sentence of up to ten years’ imprisonment.25 In Colorado,
leaving a gas station after dispensing fuel and failing to pay is outlawed by
a state fuel-piracy provision.26 In Green’s view, these kinds of specialized
theft laws are hard to justify from a normative point of view because they
seldom mark any significant differences in blameworthiness or raise
particular problems of proof or detection.27 Rather, all they do is satisfy
short-term political impulses while contributing to a broader trend of
cluttered and overly complicated criminal codes. 28
We think these concerns may have less bite on specialized theft laws
than it might seem. In fact, we think that these and similar specialized theft
statutes play an important expressive function and also serve to highlight
norms and expectations that are uniquely important to the functioning of
discrete social enterprises like retail sales and digital commerce. For these
reasons, we conclude that these specialized statutes are not only
appropriate, but also conform to the principled framework for theft laws
that Professor Green develops in Thirteen Ways.

distinctions and technicalities which previously existed in the pleading
and proof of such crimes.
COLO. REV . STAT. § 18-4-403 (2013); see also People v. Warner, 801 P.2 1187, 1189 (Colo. 1990) (en
banc) (noting that the Colorado Legislature merged the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, false
pretenses, and confidence games into a single general theft provision).
23 According to Green, “[e]ighteen states have effected a ‘complete consolidation’ of theft
law, meaning that all of the traditional species of theft (larceny, embezzlement, false
pretenses, extortion, receiving stolen property, and unauthorized use) have been consolidated
into a single offense of theft.” G REEN, supra note 1, at 27. Another twenty states have partially
consolidated their theft laws. Id.
24 See 18 P A. CONS . S TAT. A NN. § 3929.3(a), (c).
25 See N.J. S TAT. A NN. § 2C:20-25.
26 See C OLO. REV . S TAT. § 18-4-418.
27 G REEN, supra note 1, at 35. The criteria for evaluating the merits of specialized theft
statutes that we describe below are meant to complement rather than replace Green’s criteria.
28 Id. at 165-66 (describing shoplifting statutes as “narrower than ordinary larceny”); id. at
236-40 (discussing theft of intangible information not protected by intellectual property laws);
id. at 89 (disc ussing fine distinctions between some forms of theft, such as fuel piracy, and
breach of contract).
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Many of the concerns that led Professor Green to take on an
investigation of theft in the twenty-first century were part of public
conversations that took place after the death of Internet activist and social
entrepreneur Aaron Swartz.29 Swartz was accused of using an open
network on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ’s (“MIT”) campus to
download over four million academic articles from the online repository
JSTOR.30 According to the amended indictment filed in his case, Swartz
accomplished this task by using a software tool that allowed him to
download articles at a rate far faster than would be possible if he simply
pointed and clicked.31 He also used several masking techniques that
disguised his identity and the identity of his com puter to circumvent
security measures, deployed by MIT and JSTOR, that were designed to
detect and stop him from downloading that many articles in that short a
period of time.32 After he was apprehended, Swartz returned all of the files
he downloaded back to JSTOR, which at that point declined to pursue any
legal action.33 Carmen Ortiz, the U.S. Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts, was not as understanding. Amidst much controversy,34 she
secured an indictment against Swartz alleging multiple counts of wire and
computer fraud.35 If convicted, Swartz faced a potential sentence of thirty-

29

S wartz was known as a “[w]eb entrepreneur and political activist.” Evan Allen, Web
Activist
Swartz
Takes
Own
Life,
Bos.
Globe
(Jan.
12,
2013),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/01/12/web-activist-aaron-swartz-charged-withhacking-mit-dies-age/nbl1jOCxqQIFGdDANdYmxH/story.html At the age of fourteen, he
helped develop Really Simple S yndicatio n (“RS S ”), a website aggregation tool. Id. He also
founded the grassroots political action group Demand Progress and co -founded the online
news website, Reddit. Id. On January 11, 2013, S wartz committed suicide. Id. He was twentysix years old. Id.
30 JS TOR is a not-for-profit corporation that collects, stores, and makes available academic
articles from a range of scholarly journals. To cover the costs of digitizing the articles,
expenses associated with maintaining the servers and bandwidth; to pay royalty fees to the
holders of active copyrights, JS TOR collects fees from subscriber institutions like MIT, which
in turn offer access to their clients and directly to individuals who are not affiliate d with a
subscriber institution. S uperseding Indictment at 1-3, United S tates v. S wartz, No. 1:11-CR10260-NMG (D. Mass. S ept. 9, 2012), dismissed on Jan. 14, 2013, available at
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/09/swartzsuperseding.pdf [hereinafter
S uperseding Indictment].
31

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5-7.
33 See Aa ron Swartz, JS TOR (Jan. 12, 2013), http://about.jstor.org/statement-swartz.
34 See Emily Bazelon, When the Law is Worse Than the Crime: Why Was a Prosecutor Allowed to
Intimidate Aaron Swartz for So Long?, S LATE (Jan. 14, 2013, 3:59 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/01/aaron_swartz_suicide_prosecut
ors_have_too_much_power_to_charge_and_intimidate.html.
32

35

The charges in the superseding indictment include the following: two counts of wire
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five years’ imprisonment and one million dollars in fines. 36
Swartz’s indictment met with considerable criticism from a number of
corners on grounds that the law was being stretched to cover conduct that
was not truly theft or fraud, and at any rate did not warrant the degree of
punishment sought by the government. 37 In response, U.S. Attorney Ortiz
infamously declared that “‘[s]tealing is stealing whether you use a
computer command or a crowbar, and whether you take documents, data,
or dollars. It is equally harmful to the victim whether you sell what you
have stolen or give it away.’”38 Professor Green’s work in Thirteen Ways
rightly gives lie to this claim.
First, Green shows exhaustively and persuasively why the manner by
which a theft is accomplished matters quite a lot , regardless of one’s theory
of criminal punishment, because different methods of accomplishing a
theft threaten or accomplish different secondary harms. 39 Reasonable
people might disagree on the cardinal ordering of a theft accomplished by
exploiting loopholes in an open computer network and prying open a
locked door to effect a forcible entry into a home, but it is simply obtuse to
claim that there is no difference between the two.
Second, Professor Green explains why it is critical to account for
different kinds of property when assessing the moral blameworthiness of a
theft. Again, without begging the question of which is worse, stealing data
as Swartz did is not the same as stealing money at least because Swartz left

fraud pursuant to 18 U.S .C. §§ 1343 & 2, five counts of computer fraud pursuant to 18 U.S .C.
§§ 1030(a)(4), (b) & 2, five counts of unlawfully obtaining information from a protected
computer pursuant to 18 U.S .C. §§ 1030(a)(2), (b), (c)(2)(B)(iii) & 2, and one count of recklessly
damaging a protected computer pursuant to 18 U.S .C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(B), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I), (VI) & 2.
The indictment also includes forfeiture allegations pursuant to 18 U.S .C. § 981(a)(1)(C), 28
U.S .C. § 2461(c), 18 U.S .C. § 982(a)(2)(B), and 18 U.S .C. § 1030(i). S uperseding Indictment,
supra note 30, at 1, 10-16.
36 John S chwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2013, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaronswartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Press Release, United S tates
Attorney’s Office Dist. of Mass., Alleged Hacker Charged with S tealing Over Four Million
Documents
from
MIT
Network
(July
19,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2011/July/S wartzAaronPR.html.
37 For criticism of the case against S wartz after his death see, for example, Michael Phillips,
The Terrible Logic Behind the Government’s Case Against Aaron Swartz, BUZZFEED FWD (Jan. 14,
2013, 6:27 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/mtpiii/the -terrible-logic -behind-the-governmentscase-ag; Tim Wu, How the Legal System Failed Aaron Swartz—and Us, NEW YORKER (Jan. 14,
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/everyone -interesting-is-afelon.html?currentPage=all.
38 John S chwartz, Open-Access Advocate is Arrested for Huge Download, N.Y. T IMES , July 20,
2011, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/us/20compute.html.
39

G REEN, supra note 1, at 115–31.
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JSTOR in full possession of its data, whereas stealing money is very much a
zero-sum game.40
Third, Green shows that what a thief plans to do with the property he
or she has stolen matters because those plans may affect an owner ’s
property interests differently.41 For example, the value of JSTOR’s academic
repository would have been harmed very little, if at all, had Swartz simply
held on to the files he had taken. By contrast, the value of JSTOR’s property
interests would have been profoundly and permanently harmed if Swartz
had set up a competing website that gave the articles away for free.42
By taking account of the moral differences between a data theft
accomplished by computer—where the thief does not plan to publish or
otherwise release what he has taken—on the one hand, and a theft
perpetrated by breaking a locked door with a crowbar to steal money that
is subsequently spent and therefore unrecoverable, on the other hand, we
do not mean to suggest that Swartz did not do anything wrong, 43 or even
criminal.44 Rather, the point we take from Professor Green’s work is that
understanding exactly what the wrong is, and how it should be addressed,
requires thoughtful precision. Consolidated theft statutes and U.S.
Attorney Ortiz’s defense of her indictment fail to persuade because they
indulge in hammy platitudes and uncritical analogy. By contrast, we see
significant potential in specialized theft statutes to accomplish precisely the
conceptual and normative precision that Professor Green rightly demands
of our criminal laws.
In our view, specialized theft statutes have a unique and important role
in the general project that Professor Green advances in Thirteen Ways. Both
at the frontiers of twenty-first century theft, and in cases closer to the
traditional core of theft law, specialized theft statutes highlight the unique
moral, political, and social conditions of the property regimes that are
affected by acts of theft. In the subsequent sections of this essay we

40

See id. at 203-04.
Id. at 75-76, 273.
42 JS TOR clearly recognized as much when it declined to pursue legal action against
S wartz after securing both a return of the stolen files and a reliable representation from
S wartz that he did not intend to distribute the articles he downloaded. See Aaron Swartz,
JS TOR (Jan. 12, 2013), http://about.jstor.org/statement-swartz.
41

43 In fact, one of Mr. S wartz’s most sympathetic supporters, Harvard Professor Lawrence
Lessig, publicly disagreed with Mr. S wartz’s conduct. Mike Wendy, Larry Lessig Responds—
Says Swartz’s Alleged Actions Crossed Ethical Line, M EDIA FREEDOM (July 20, 2011),
http://mediafreedom.org/2011/07/larry -lessig-responds-says-swartzs-alleged-actions-crossedethical-line/ (last visited S ept. 16, 2013).
44 As we argue below, our enterprise account of theft makes it very hard to see how
S wartz’s conduct could be “criminal” without showing how his conduct fundamentally
undermined a socially significant property regime.
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highlight two particularly important functions of specialized theft statutes:
First, specialized theft statutes serve an important expressive and educative
function in cases where common intuitions frequently fail to recognize or
give sufficient weight to legitimate property interests affected by a theft.
Second, even where those interests may be patent, specialized theft statutes
defend unique property norms that are internal to particular social,
political, or economic enterprise.
II.

Specialized Theft Laws Play an Important Expressive and
Educative Function.

The public debate about the prosecution of Aaron Swartz focused on
two main concerns. The first was that prosecutors engaged in excessive
charging, and as a consequence put Mr. Swartz at risk of punishment far
greater than his conduct deserved.45 Some, in fact, argued that his conduct,
although perhaps unethical or even minimally criminal, was so minor that
the better course for the prosecutor would have been not to charge him at
all.46 The second was that his conduct itself was not theft because the
documents he liberated from JSTOR’s servers should be openly available.47
We think that specialized theft laws play an important role in advancing
both of these conversations by providing a forum and tool for education
and expression. This is a particularly important service with respect to
many twenty-first century theft crimes, like unauthorized downloading,
which many people would reflexively not regard as criminal or even
particularly immoral. In the context of more fundamental debates about
the nature of theft itself, specialized theft laws, and particularly the process
of public debate surrounding their passage or defeat, also provide a unique
forum for exploring and marking the boundaries of property in the twentyfirst century. We explore both of these points below.
The empirical study prominently featured in Thirteen Ways inspires our
view that theft law s play important expressive and educative functions. As
part of an effort to assess common intuitions regarding the relative moral
wrong that accompanies thefts accomplished by different means and
45 See David Friedman, Overcharging: The Aaron Swartz Case, IDEAS (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.com/2013/01/overcharging-aaron-swartz-case.html.
46 Reason Foundation, Aaron Swartz Was Driven to Suicide by a Broken System, O PPOSING
V IEWS (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.opposingviews.com/i/politics/aaron-swartz-punishmentdid-not-fit-crime. In this argument, Mr. S wartz’s allies appear to have a friend in Professor
Green. See G REEN, supra note 1, at 161-65 (arguing that de minimis theft offenses should be
effectively decriminalized).
47 Mr. S wartz himself was a prominent member of the “open source” movement, and
issued a manifesto calling others to join him in an effort to copy and make available on the
Internet the contents o f libraries. Aaron S wartz, Guerilla Open Access Manifesto, A RCHIVE ,
http://archive.org/details/GuerillaOpenAccessManifesto (last visited S ept. 16, 2013).
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targeting different kinds of property, Professor Green surveyed 172
incoming Rutgers University-Newark law students.48 These subjects were
asked to evaluate two sets of stories related to theft offenses. The first set
involved a series of twelve scenarios concerning the theft of a $350 bicycle
accomplished by different means, including armed robbery, simple
robbery, extortion, blackmail, theft by housebreaking, larceny,
embezzlement, looting, false pretenses, passing a bad check, failing to
return lost or misdelivered property, and receiving stolen property. 49
Subjects were asked to rank the scenarios in order of blameworthiness and
to assign a sentence. The second set of stories was designed to measure
intuitions regarding the relative blameworthiness of stealing different
kinds of property.50 Here, Green’s subjects were asked to assess the relative
seriousness of taking four different goods, each of which was valued at $50:
a physical test-preparation book, a downloaded electronic file, a seat in a
test-preparation lecture where the auditorium had empty seats, and a seat
in a test-preparation lecture where the auditorium had no empty seats.51
The results of the first part of Green’s study were not surprising and
confirm his moral critique of consolidated theft statutes. With a few
outliers, participants consistently ranked armed robbery as the most
blameworthy, followed by extortion.52 At the other end of the spectrum,
participants consistently ranked receiving stolen goods and failing to
return misdelivered property as the least blameworthy methods by which
to accomplish a theft.53 Sentencing recommendations confirmed these
rankings. Students sentenced armed robbery most harshly, followed by
extortion.54 Receiving stolen property and failing to return misdelivered
property were given the lightest sentences.55
Particularly given the current controversy over illegal downloading
and digital pirating evident in the public debate about the prosecution of
Aaron Swartz, the results of the second part of Professor Green’s study are
both surprising and informative. Although 56% of participants said that
stealing a physical book was more blameworthy than stealing an electronic
copy, 3% said that stealing the electronic book was worse and 41% said that
there was no difference between the two.56 This result is surprising to us.

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

G REEN, supra note 1, at 54, 57.
These, of course, are Green’s titular “thirteen ways” to accomplish a theft. Id. at 57-60.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 61.
G REEN, supra note 1, at 61-62.
Id.
Id. at 67.

861 GRAY .FINAL OR .DOCX (DO NOT DE LE TE )

2013

In De f e ns e o f S pe cia liz e d T he f t S t at ut e s

11/13/2013 1:50 PM

871

Particularly given the casual attitude that many people seem to have
toward downloading songs and movies from the Internet,57 buying pirated
movies and music from subway vendors,58 or copying software from their
friends,59 we would have expected a vast majority of respondents in
Professor Green’s study to report that downloading the electronic book
was less blameworthy than stealing a physical book.60 Although relevant
comparative empirical evidence is sparse, we suspect that the results of
Green’s study reflect the educative and expressive success of civil
litigation, criminal prosecutions, and efforts to pass specialized statutes
targeting the theft of digital property.
Unfortunately, we do not have the benefit of a prior study similar to
the one conducted by Professor Green from which we can establish a
baseline of comparison. Nevertheless, his research and ours indicate that
the predominat view of unlawful downloading in the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries was that it was either not theft, or was
substantially less serious than theft of physical objects. Dowling v. United
States, decided by the Supreme Court in 1985, provides a useful starting
point.61 The appellant in that case, Paul Edmond Dowling, was convicted of
violating § 2314 of the National Stolen Property Act (“NSPA”) after
shipping thousands of bootleg Elvis Presley records across the country. 62
Section 2314 prohibited the interstate transport of “goods, wares,
merchandise, securities or money of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing
the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud.”63 The question
before the Court was whether a “bootleg” record that included
unauthorized copyright-protected musical performances could be
considered merchandise “stolen, converted or taken by fraud” pursuant to

57 Cf. Matthew Mirapaul, Is it Theft, or is it Freedom? 7 Views of the Web’s Impact on Culture
Clashes,
N.Y.
TIMES ,
S ept.
20,
2000,
at
H42,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/20/business/entertainment-it-theft-it-freedom-7-views-webs-impact-culture-clashes.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
58 See David Mills, Video Pirates’ New Movie Booty; Camcorders Tape Screen Hits, WASH. P OST,
May 1, 1991, at B1.
59

See John Markoff, Though Illegal, Copied Software is Now Common, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
1992, at A1.
60 Green reports some of the evidence of these attitudes in Thirteen Ways, including
industry claims “that between 50 and 90 percent of all computer software used is
unauthorized,” that “2.6 billion infringing music files are downloaded every month,” and that
“[c]opyright infringement alone is estimated to cost about $58 billion and 373,000 jobs a year.”
G REEN, supra note 1, at 249.
61
62
63

473 U.S . 207 (1985). Green also discusses Dowling. See G REEN, supra note 1, at 254.
Dowling, 473 U.S . at 208-09.
Id. at 208 (quoting 18 U.S .C. § 2314 (1982)).
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the NSPA.64 For his own part, Dowling argued that the statute prohibited
only the taking of physical property and did not reach copyright. 65
Although he admitted that stealing, say, a crate of records packaged for
retail sale would constitute theft on this standard, Dowling pointed out
that he manufactured or otherwise lawfully acquired all of his physical
goods. What he was accused of “stealing” was not physical property, then,
but the recorded contents, which remained in the possession of their
owners.66 Absent interference with title or a possessory interest, Dowling
maintained, there could be no “theft.”67 Without disputing the fact that
common law theft usually entailed some interference with title or
possession, the government argued that unauthorized use of the musical
compositions amounted to theft, conversion, or fraud.68
Expressing views that surely were predominat in 1985, the Court
agreed with Dowling, reasoning that the statute was, in essence, an
instantiation of common law theft, and therefore required a component of
physical interference that copyright infringement lacks. 69 Drawing on that
common law sensibility, the Court marked a distinction between the rights
protected in copyright and “the possessory interest of the owner of simple
‘goods, wares [or] merchandise.’”70 Unlike the holder of “ordinary chattel,”
the Court wrote, “[a] copyright, like other intellectual property, comprises
a series of carefully defined and carefully delimited interests to which the
law affords correspondingly exact protections.”71 The Court reasoned that
the language of the statute did not reach the taking that occurs when an
infringer violates the rights of a copyright owner because “he does not
assume physical control over the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its
owner of its use.”72 “While one may colloquially link infringement with
some general notion of wrongful appropriation,” the Court concluded,
“infringement plainly implicates a more complex set of property interests
than does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud.”73 Based in part upon
this reasoning, the Court held that the contents of bootleg records are not
goods “stolen, converted or taken by fraud” within the meaning of the

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 216 (quoting 18 U.S .C. § 2314).
See id. at 214.
See id. at 216.
See id.
See Dowling, 473 U.S . at 214-15.
See id. at 217-18.
See id. at 217 (quoting 18 U.S .C. § 2314).
Id. at 216.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 217-18.
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Act.74
During the mid-1990s, as the Internet expanded, so too did concerns
about its potential to “virtually negate[]”75 property rights in copyrighted
materials by facilitating the illegal copying and distribution of protected
materials.76 Take, for example, the emergence of electronic “bulletinboards,” which early on confounded the entertainment industry. 77 These
boards were file-sharing systems that allowed users to link com puters
through phone lines to send and receive files and programs, often in
violation of copyright protections.78 One contemporary news article
described the quandary companies faced in determining the exact nature of
the “wrong” committed when copyrighted files are traded over the
Internet and who to hold liable for the infringement: “When someone
downloads a snippet of music from a network like CompuServe Inc., can
the on-line service be held liable? When someone transmits a wor k, are
they ‘copying’ it in the legal sense of the word or merely ‘displaying’ it?”79
Although these questions were in the air, popular public views continued
to reflect the Court’s holding in Dowling, and therefore regarded
downloading copyrighted materials through bulletin boards or other
forums as something less than stealing.80 That began to change with the
coordinated legal attack on Napster.
In 1999, eighteen-year-old Shawn Fanning launched a pioneering filesharing program called Napster.81 This “peer-to-peer” network allowed
users to directly exchange digital audio files.82 Once a Napster subscriber
signed onto the program’s network, Napster servers searched his or her

74

Dowling, 473 U.S . at 228.
G REEN, supra note 1, at 256.
76 See, e.g., Kenneth D. S uzan, Tapping to the Beat of a Digital Drummer: Fine Tuning U.S.
Copyright Law for Music Distribution on the Internet, 59 A LB . L. REV . 789, 789-80 (1996); Peter H.
Lewis, 160 Nations Meet to Weigh Revision of Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/02/business/160 -nations-meet-to-weigh-revision-ofcopyright-law.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; Peter N. S potts, Copyright Laws Play Catch-Up in
Digital Age: Goal is to Stop the Duplication of Protected Material, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 27,
1995, at 9, available at http://www.csmo nitor.com/1995/0127/27091.html.
75

77 See Junda Woo, Legal Beat: Copyright Law is Easy to Break on the Internet, Hard to Enforce,
WALL S T. J., Oct. 10, 1994, at B6.
78 See Junda Woo, Copyright Laws Enter the Fight Against Electronic Bulletin Board, WALL. S T.
J., S ept. 27, 1994, at B11.
79 Woo, supra note 77.
80 See G REEN, supra note 1, at 249.
81
See Karl Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME (Oct. 2, 2000),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2053826,00.html.
82

Id.
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computer for music files.83 These file names were then uploaded to the
Napster server where other users could search the index for a particular
song or artist.84 If the search returned results, users simply selected the file
they wished to download, and the Napster servers connected the host -user
with the querying-user to facilitate a direct download of the selected file. 85
Eighteen months after its launch, Napster had thirty -eight million
registered users.86 It was precisely that success that would prove fatal to
Napster’s future.
In December 1999, eighteen record companies, all members of the
Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), sued Napster in the
Northern District of California for copyright infringement and unfair
competition.87 Just one month later, a group of music publishers filed a
similar suit.88 All plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions barring Napster
from engaging in “copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or
distributing copyrighted music without the express permission of the
rights owner.”89 The district court rejected Napster ’s affirmative defenses,
including fair use and misuse of copyright, and granted the plaintiffs ’
preliminary injunction.90 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the district court ’s grant of the
injunction, requiring Napster to remove any user file from its index if
Napster had reasonable knowledge that the file contained copyrighted
material.91 The terms of the injunction proved to be too much for the
company to bear. Although Napster barred its users from sharing ma ny
copyrighted files, it was simply unable to prevent all copyright -infringing
downloads through its service. Faced with this evidence of continued
noncompliance, the district court issued a shutdown order in July 2001. 92 In

83 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. S upp. 2d 896, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2000) aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
84

Id.
Id.
86 Amy Harmon, Napster Users Mourn End of Free Music, N.Y. T IMES , Nov. 1, 2000, at C1.
87
See A & M Records, Inc., 114 F. S upp. 2d at 900; RIAA Members, RIAA,
http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php?content_selector=aboutus_members&f=# (last visited S ept.
16, 2013) (showing an updated list of RIAA members).
88 A & M Records, Inc., 114 F. S upp. 2d at 900.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 912, 923, 927.
91 A & M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1027. The Ninth Circuit modified the injunction slightly
to only impose contributory liability to the extent that Napster “(1) receives reasonable
knowledge of specific infringing files with copyrighted musical compositions and sound
recordings; (2) knows or should know that such files are available on the Napster system; and
(3) fails to act to prevent viral distribution of the works.” Id.
85

92

See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002); S am
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June 2002, Napster filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.93
Following the demise of Napster, the RIAA launched a major litigation
program against illegal file-sharing more generally. The RIAA targeted
individual file-sharers on peer-to-peer networks on college campuses by
writing letters to the institutions whose networks were being used to
facilitate their activities.94 These “pre-litigation letters” were then passed to
the copyright-infringing students who were given two options: settle with
the RIAA or face a lawsuit.95 Many settled, but not all. For example,
Jammie Thomas went to trial after the RIAA issued to her a cease-anddesist letter for her file-sharing activity.96 She lost at trial, and eventually
was ordered to pay $222,000 in damages by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.97
The fight against digital piracy was not just waged in the courts. In the
late 1990s, Congress passed the No Electronic Theft Act (“NET Act”) and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).98 Both laws
strengthened protections for copyrighted works. For example, the NET Act
targeted copyright infringers who were not motivated by financial gain by
including in the definition of “private financial gain” the “receipt, or
expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other
copyrighted works.”99 The DMCA also included an anti-circumvention rule
that prohibited individuals from tampering with a technological measure
that controls access to a copyrighted work, such as decrypting an
encrypted device.100
Costello, Court Orders Napster to Stay Shut, PCWORLD (Mar. 25, 2002, 5:00 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/91144/article.html.
93 Benny Evangelista, Napster Files for Bankruptcy, S.F. CHRON., June 4, 2002, at B1, available
a t http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Napster-files-for-bankruptcy-2813933.php.
94 Emily Banks, Record Industry's Threats Seem to Reduce Illegal File Sharing: An Aggressive
Campaign of Writing Letters to College Officials and Threatening to Sue Students Seems to Be Making
a Dent in Illegal Downloads, S TAR TRIB ., Mar. 3, 2008, at 3B, available at
http://www.startribune.com/local/16167797.html?refer=y.
95 Id.
96 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2012); Greg
S andoval, Appeals Court Sides with RIAA, Jammie Thomas Owes $222,000, CNET (Sept. 11, 2012,
9:25 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57510453-93/appeals-court-sides-with-riaajammie-thomas-owes-$222000/.
97 Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d at 910.
98 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 S tat. 2678; Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 S tat. 2860.
99 Lori A. Morea, The Future of Music in A Digital Age: The Ongoing Conflict Between
Copyright Law and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV . 195, 215-16 (2006).
100 See 17 U.S .C. § 1201 (2006). The DMCA is also widely noted for limiting the liability of
Internet service providers and hosting services for the intellectual property violations of their
users. Kravets, supra note 19.
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Specialized statutes targeting digital piracy continue to multiply. For
example, in 2008, Congress passed the Prioritizing Resources and
Organization for Intellectual Property Act (“PRO IP Act”), which enhanced
criminal penalties for copyright infringement and established the Office of
the United States Intellectual Property Enforcement Representative within
the Executive Branch.101 That same year, Tennessee became the first state in
the country to sign a bill into law that required state public and private
educational institutions to adopt policies prohibiting the infringement of
copyright-protected works over school networks.102 In 2011, Senator Patrick
Leahy of Vermont introduced the Preventing Real Online Threats to
Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act, known as the
PROTECT IP Act.103 The PROTECT IP Act would allow the Department of
Justice to commence civil lawsuits against domain name registrants or the
domain names directly.104 The PROTECT IP Act would further allow a
court to issue a cease-and-desist order to the registrant, or its owner or
operator, if the site is dedicated to infringing activities. 105
Alongside these legislative and prosecutorial efforts, law enforcement
agencies and trade organizations, like the RIAA and the Motion Picture
Association of America, have engaged in a sustained effort to shape public
perceptions of unlawful downloading.106 Professor Green describes some of
the highlights in Thirteen Ways, including a Justice Department website,
which advises readers that “copying [software] from the Internet . . . is the
same as stealing it from a store,” and a pervasive advertising campaign
designed to draw parallels between stealing “a car . . . a handbag . . . a
mobile phone . . . [or] a DVD” and downloading pirated films.107
There can be little doubt that these efforts to target unlawful
downloading have expressive value and educative effects. Before Napster’s
downfall, downloading free, copyrighted music was widely accepted and
widely practiced, apparently without risk. 108 To the extent it was
condemned, few appeared to regard it as a kind of theft on par with
101

Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-403, 122 S tat. 4256.
102 T ENN. CODE . A NN. § 49-7-142 (West 2009).
103
PROTECT IP Act, S .
968, 112th Cong. (2011),
available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS -112s968is/pdf/BILLS -112s968is.pdf.
104

Id. § 3(a)(1).
Id. § 3(b)(1).
106 See Charles Lane, High Court to Weigh File Sharing; Industry Likens Practice to Theft,
WASH. P OST, Dec. 11, 2004, at E1; Editorial, The New York Times Stands Strongly Against Theft on
the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2005, at A22.
107 G REEN, supra note 1, at 247.
108 See Erik Ahlberg, The Best Way to…Find Tunes—The Wide Range of Choices Online Will be
Music to Your Ears, WALL S T. J., Nov. 27, 2000, at R22.
105
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stealing a physical book. Today, however, as Green’s study reveals, a
substantial proportion of people view unlawful downloading as just as bad
as stealing physical goods.109 Some even think it is worse.110 There is very
little reason to think that this shift would have occurred without concerted
public education efforts, including the debate and passage of specialized
theft statutes such as the DMCA and the PROTECT IP Act.
The expressive and educative value of specialized theft statutes is not
diminished when public debate leads to the defeat of a particular measure.
Take, for example, Congress’s recent failure to pass the Stop Online Piracy
Act (“SOPA”).111 Like the PROTECT IP Act, SOPA would have both
expanded criminal liability for unauthorized streaming and downloading,
and granted law enforcement broad power to seek injunctions against
websites, search engines, and Internet service providers whose services
facilitated illegal downloading.112 In part due to public resistance organized
by Aaron Swartz and others associated with the open access movement,
SOPA did not become law.113 Rather than undercutting our claim here—
that specialized theft statutes play an important expressive and educative
function—the defeat of SOPA, and particularly the public debate about
SOPA and its alternatives, such as the Online Protection and Enforcement
of Digital Trade Act, proves our point.114 At the frontiers of twenty-first

109

G REEN, supra note 1, at 67.
Id. Three percent of respondents in Green’s empirical study viewed stealing an
electronic book as more blameworthy than stealing a physical book.
110

111 H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Matt Williams, Sopa and Pipa Votes Shelved After Congress
Climbs Down on Piracy Bills, G UARDIAN (London) (Jan. 20, 2012, 11:44 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jan/20/pipa-vote-shelved-harry-reid.
112 John Naughton, Q&A: Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), G UARDIAN (London) (Jan. 21,
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jan/22/sopa-pipa-johhn-naughton.
113 See Hayley Tsukayama, Alexis Ohanian, Reddit Co-Founder and Web Advocate, WASH.
P OST, S ept. 5, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/alexis -ohanianreddit-c o-founder-and-web-advocate/2012/09/05/f642f1b6-eb9f-11e1-9ddc 340d5efb1e9c_story.html; Caitlin Dewey, Aaron Swartz, Internet Activist and Innovator
Remembered
by
Reddit
Community,
WASH.
P OST,
Jan.
14,
2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/aaron-swartz-internet-activist-and-innovatorremebered
-by-reddit-community/2013/01/14/3549363c -5e90-11e2-a389ee565c81c565_story.html.
114 S . 2029, 112th Cong. (2011) / H.R. 3782, 112th Cong. (2012); see, e.g., Naughton, supra
note 112 (demonstrating that the media thought it worthwhile to educate the public about
S OPA and that many expressed dissent). In 2011, S enators Amy Klobuchar, John Cornyn, and
Chris Coons introduced another piece of legislation that would have made it easier for federal
prosecutors to pursue websites that illegally stream copyright-protected works. The
Commercial Felony Streaming Act provides for up to five years’ imprisonment for a website
operator who transmits at least ten streams of copyright-protected public performances
provided that the retail value of the streams, or the total economic value of the streams to the
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century theft, debates about specialized theft statutes draw otherwise
unrecognized issues to the attention of civil society. The passage and
failure of specialized theft statutes play an even more critical role by
marking the contested boundaries and shaping our theories and
conceptions of property going forward.
In a 2012 New York Times editorial applying some of the views
Professor Green advances in Thirteen Ways to a Department of Justice
investigation of a file-sharing site, he notes that “[t]he criminal law also
plays an important role in informing, shaping, and reinforcing societal
norms.”115 He nevertheless reports the results of his study as showing that
“lay observers draw a sharp moral distinction between file sharing and
genuine theft, even when the value of the property is the same.”116 We see
the available data differently. By comparing evidence of lay views from the
early years of the Internet age to the results of Green’s own empirical
study, we see evidence of a marked shift in public intuitions toward
regarding illegal downloading as a form of “cyber theft” that is on par with
traditional larceny. Where few people regarded downloading as wrong,
much less a form of criminal theft, during the heyday of Napster, Professor
Green’s empirical work shows that a substantial portion of society now
regards unauthorized downloading as at least on par with larceny of
physical property.117 This shift can be attributed in significant part to
specialized theft statutes, targeted prosecutions, and focused public
interest messaging. Of course, that success may well be undesirable to the
extent that it is founded on a conceptual or moral mistake. 118 We turn to
this question in the next section.
III.

Are Unlawful Downloading and Other Forms of Twenty-First
Century Stealing “Theft”?

Professor Green might concede that specialized theft statutes focusing
on unlawful downloading and file sharing have been successful in shaping
public views, but nevertheless object to them on normative or conceptual
grounds. For example, he might contend that conduct like that alleged by
the government in its prosecution of Aaron Swartz should not be

infringer, exceeds $2,500. See S . 978, 112th Cong. (2011).
115 S tuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Community Perceptions of Theft Seriousness: A
Challenge to Model Penal Code and English Theft Act Consolidation, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
511, 516 (2010).
116 S tuart P. Green, Op-Ed, When Stealing Isn’t Stealing, N.Y. T IMES , Mar. 29, 2012, at A27,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/opinion/theft-law-in-the-21st-century.html?
pagewanted=all; see also G REEN, supra note 1, at 67-68.
117
118

G REEN, supra note 1, at 67 tbl.3.
See infra Part IV.
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criminalized at all. Alternatively, he might argue that, to the extent such
conduct is or should be criminal, it is an error to categorize it a s “theft.”
Although many of Swartz’s most ardent defenders have argued that his
conduct was not, or should not be regarded as, criminal, Professor Green
remains largely agnostic on this point in Thirteen Ways, preferring instead
to draw a conceptual line between “theft” and twenty-first century offenses
like unauthorized downloading.119 In this section, we suggest some reasons
why readers might not want to follow Professor Green down this road.
One of Professor Green’s objections to specialized theft statutes is that
they crowd criminal codes and sometimes make it confusing to figure out
exactly what is and is not criminal.120 There is, therefore, a certain tension
in his resistance against efforts to categorize illegal downloading as a form
of theft in that adopting his views would require more specialized law in
these areas. There is surely a happy median between elegance and
conceptual precision, of course, so we do not regard this tension as
anything more than practical. Those practicalities aside, we are far more
interested in Professor Green’s arguments for drawing a conceptual
distinction between “theft” crimes and what he regards as quite different
sorts of twenty-first century offenses like unlawful downloading, often
referred to as theft crimes.
Although his argument is more nuanced than we can hope to capture
in a few sentences, the essence of Professor Green’s position is that not all
property can be stolen and only some interferences with property rights
can accurately be categorized as “theft.” “Property,” Green writes, “is best
thought of not as a physical thing but as the bundle of rights organized
around the idea of securing, for the right of the holder , exclusive use or
access to, or control of, a thing.”121 This definition is in broad accord with
the Restatement, which uses “property” to “denote legal relations between
persons with respect to a thing,” which may have a “physical existence or
it may be any kind of an intangible such as a patent right or a chose in
action.”122 Among the “legal relations” commonly associated with property
are rights to possess, alter, exclude, consume, sell, encumber, rent,
exchange, or destroy.123 Not all property is capable of underwriting all of
these rights, of course. Moreover, each of these rights has a different
character. As a consequence, some property is hard or impossible to sell
because it cannot be readily commoditized. 124 Other forms of property are

119
120
121
122
123
124

See G REEN, supra note 1, at 246-52; Phillips, supra note 37; Wu, supra note 37.
G REEN, supra note 1, at 36.
Id. at 73.
RESTATEMENT FIRST OF P ROP. ch. 1, intro. note (1936).
G REEN, supra note 1, at 74.
Id. at 208.
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highly elastic, which allows many people to possess or use the property
without materially affecting the ability of others to do the same. 125 It is
these two features, commoditizability and exclusivity, that most concern
Professor Green.126
In Professor Green’s view, the only “kind of property that can be
subject to theft reflects two basic requirements: first, it must be
commodifiable, meaning that it is capable of being bought and sold; and,
second, it must be rivalrous, meaning that consumption of it by one user
will prevent simultaneous consumption by others.”127 In short, property
that can be stolen has a certain “zero-sumness.”128 So, for example, we have
a copy of Professor Green’s book. It is a commodity. We paid money for it,
and can certainly sell it to someone else when we are through with it.129
Once it is in possession of another, however, it is beyond our use. On this
definition, Green points out, it is hard to make the case that intellectual
property, particularly when reduced to digital files, is the sort of property
that can be stolen. Take the example given to participants in Green ’s study
of an electronic book. There is no doubt that a digitized book stored on a
server is a commodity. The file itself can be bought or sold. It can also be
rented by, for example, affording one user access to the contents for a
limited period of time. In a more familiar contemporary model, the owner
of the electronic book might also charge buyers a one-time fee that would
allow them to copy the file for future perusal at their leisure. An electronic
book, therefore, has one key feature of property that can be stolen:
commoditizability.130 Where an electronic book begins to look unlike the
kind of property that can be stolen on Green’s account is the feature that he
describes as “zero-sumness.”131
By its nature, an electronic file is endlessly elastic. Whether it is copied
and downloaded once or a billion times, the file is not degraded and
remains on the owner’s server, ready for use at any time he or she likes. In
this sense, any property interest that an owner might have in the content of
an electronic file is not rivalrous.132 An electronic copy of a book can be
125

Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 74, 267-69.
127 Id. at 74.
128 Id. at 80.
129 In assuming a robust market for Professor Green’s book, we deny with all seriousness
his self-deprecating description of it as “an obscure book on the moral theory of theft law.”
G REEN, supra note 1, at 255.
126

130 See Niva Elkin-Koren, The Changing Nature of Books and the Uneasy Case for Copyright, 79
G EO. WASH. L. REV. 1712, 1725-26 (2011) (discussing how ebooks could be published in fewer
steps and with less cost than traditional publications).
131
132

See G REEN, supra note 1, at 80.
Id. at 255-56.
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copied and read by everyone or no one without affecting the ability of the
owner to do the same because the owner still has “the work, even after the
illegal downloads have occurred.”133 This does not mean that the rights of
the book’s owner are not affected by illegal downloading, for they surely
are.134 For example, the right to exclude is violated by unauthorized
downloading, as is the right to rent or sell copies of his or her book. In fact,
unauthorized downloading and distribution might mean that “the
economic value of [the electronic book] has been virtually negat ed.”135 The
owner may even have a right to remedy in trespass or tort. Unauthorized
downloading is nevertheless not a theft in Green’s view because it
interferes with neither possession nor title, no matter the degree of
interference with commercial value.136
In keeping with our defense of specialized theft statutes, we think that
Professor Green’s focus on commodification and rivalrousness , as two
necessary features of property that can be stolen, is too narrow. In our
view, “theft” should encompass any criminal interference with property
rights, the respect for which is sufficiently central to a socially significant
enterprise to make protecting those rights a legitimate matter of public
interest. In making this proposal, we rely on a very parsimonious view of
criminality that we attribute to a certain brand of retributivism rooted in
the work of Immanuel Kant.137 One of us has written at length elsewhere
about Kant’s criminal theory and the constraints it puts on the scope of
criminalization.138 We will not repeat that work here, but a few words are
necessary to explain our disagreement with Professor Green and the
alternative that disagreement recommends.
Kant’s theory of punishment is linked to his moral theory, which in
turn is built around the categorical imperative.139 In its most popular
formulation, the categorical imperative requires simply that “I should
never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should
become a universal law.”140 By “maxim,” Kant means “[a] rule that the

133

Id.
Id. at 254-57.
135 Id. at 256.
136 See id. at 78-80.
137 See, e.g., David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 V AND. L. REV . 1619, 1659-60 (2010)
(discussing the central feature of Immanuel Kant’s moral theory).
134

138 See id.; David Gray & Jonathan Huber, Retributivism for Progressives: A Response to
Professor Flanders, 70 M D. L. REV . 141, 153-57 (2010).
139 Gray, supra note 137, at 1660.
140 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 14 (James W. Ellington
trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1993).
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agent himself makes his principle [of action] on subjective grounds.”141
Thus, the categorical imperative allows us to act upon principles of
conduct that can be universalized without contradiction. 142 Contrariwise, it
forbids us to act on maxims that fail the test of logical purity in that they
contain their own contradiction.143 For some crimes, like murder or suicide,
the contradiction is inherent in the conduct. After all, proposing as
universal law the maxim of murder would be to propose the extinction of
rational beings.144 For other crimes, however, the contradiction is only to be
found by reference to a norm or condition that is necessary to the social
enterprise, which the conduct, as a crime, offends. Theft is one of these.
Let us assume for the time being that the maxim of theft “is taking the
property of another.”145 Theft is immoral in a society that recognizes the
concept of ownership because the maxim “I take that which is not mine”
cannot be universalized without contradicting the very concept of
ownership upon which the maxim itself depends. 146 We can, of course,
imagine living in a society where property is held collectively rather than
individually owned. In such a world, theft would have no meaning, and
therefore would not be criminal.147 In our society, however, where
possession and title in property play a central role in a wide range of social
practices, engaging in conduct that offends rights of possession or title is a
crime, which we call “theft.”148
Until quite recently, the social practices that were both sufficiently
close to our cultural core and required some respect for property rights
could be adequately defended by limiting the scope of “theft” crimes to
conduct that contradicted rights of possession and title. That is increasingly
less true. As our social practices have diversified, expanded, and become
more anonymous, so too have we come to depend on respect for norms
that once were secondary, unworthy of note, or even incomprehensible to
our common law forebears. As we see it, specialized theft statutes, and

141

Id. at 17-18. An agent’s maxim of action is, by definition available, only to him but can
be imputed to him based on his actions. Id. at 18-19.
142

Id. at 18; Gray, supra note 137, at 1661-62.
Gray, supra note 137, at 1662.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
147 Cf. id. (explaining that, because theft requires taking another’s property, it can be
inferred that, if property is owned collectively there is no pro perty of another to be taken—
thus rendering “theft” a nullity and, accordingly, not criminal).
143

148 Although they differ in the details, many retributivist theories follow this basic outline.
See, e.g., Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in O N G UILT AND INNOCENCE 31, 34-35 (1979);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-57 (1971); 1 G EORGE P. FLETCHER, THE G RAMMAR OF
CRIMINAL LAW: A MERICAN, COMPARATIVE , AND INTERNATIONAL 230-31, 233 (2007).
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contests around them, have a unique role to play in this changing world
because they highlight these new social practices and public interests in
defending their normative preconditions. Furthermore, contests over these
specialized statutes afford an important opportunity to engage in civil
society and political debates about not only the internal conditions of these
emerging enterprises, but also whether they are sufficiently central to
twenty-first century life to be worthy of defense by the criminal law.149
By way of explanation, let us consider an example of a specialized theft
statute that does not challenge Professor Green’s definition of theft.
Pennsylvania recently passed an organized r etail theft statute.150 The law
works in tandem with Pennsylvania’s retail theft and receiving-stolenproperty laws to prohibit the coordination, control, supervision, or
management of an organized retail theft enterprise. 151 Stolen merchandise
with a retail value between $5,000 and $19,000 is graded as a third-degree
felony and stolen merchandise with a retail value of more than $20,000 is
considered a second-degree felony.152 Even under Professor Green’s
definition of property that can rightly be the t arget of theft, retail goods
qualify. They not only have a commercial value, but the shoplifter ’s
possession of goods is directly adverse to the shopkeeper ’s. Green is
nevertheless skeptical of specialized statutes such as this because they add
nothing of moral significance over general prohibitions on theft and,
therefore, add unnecessary clutter to the criminal law. 153 We think this
might be too fast.
In 2010, organized retail crime resulted in losses estimated between
fifteen and thirty billion dollars.154 The scale of those losses is in part due to
the activities of organized shoplifting rings, which methodically steal
merchandise from stores. As Representative Tom Caltigarone, who
sponsored the Pennsylvania bill, pointed out, “[t]hese organizations, many
of which operate across state lines, overwhelm retailers with large numbers

149 This marks an important distinction between the criminal law, as a species of public
law, and private law, including contract and tort. Although we do not accuse Professor Green
of making this mistake, an excessive focus on the impact of a particular theft on the interests
of an owner or possessor risks equivocating between the two. Kant avoids this trap by linking
criminal prohibitions not to the impact of a particular act on a specific victim, but the
consequences for a social enterprise that would result if all participants engaged in the
conduct marked as a “crime.” RAWLS, supra note 148, at 251-57.
150 Organized Retail Theft Act, 2010 Pa. Laws 212 (codified as amended at 18 P A. CONST.
S TAT. A NN. § 3929.3 (West 2012)).
151 18 P A. CONST. S TAT. A NN. § 3929.3 (West 2012).
152 Id.
153 See G REEN, supra note 1, at 34-36.
154
Latest
on
Organized
Retail
Crime,
NAT’L
RETAIL
FED’N,
http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Dashboard&id=64 (last visited S ept. 16, 2013).

861 GRAY .FINAL OR .DOCX (DO NOT DE LE TE )

884

Ne w E ng la n d La w Re vie w

11/13/2013 1:50 PM

v. 47 | 861

of shoplifters simultaneously.”155 “They may [also] target the same store
more than once, knowing they can risk the arrest of one or some of the
group members and still carry out the j ob.”156 The primary outlets for these
stolen goods are grey market fence operators, who sell the illegally
obtained goods through pawn shops, flea markets, and auction sites. 157
Some who purchase these goods know, or suspect, that they are stolen. In
fact, many find a certain thrill in buying “hot” merchandise.158 As evidence
of these attitudes, the respondents to Professor Green’s questionnaire
ranked receiving stolen property as the least serious form of theft.159 This
signals to us a broad lack of appreciation for the impact that shoplifting
and receiving stolen goods have on the key social enterprise of retail sales.
Specialized theft statutes like this Pennsylvania law , therefore, serve an
important expressive and educative function by highlighting both the
importance of retail commerce in contemporary society and the impact of
shoplifting and abetting shoplifting on that enterprise. For both the
thoughtless and the ignorant among us, these statutes highlight our
important roles in these property regimes and the norms of conduct these
enterprises require in order to persist.
Of course shoplifting is theft even on Green’s account. We are, after all,
talking about goods that are r ivalrous commodities. But how does the
enterprise approach we have sketched here help us to make sense of
specialized theft statutes for twenty-first century crimes like New Jersey’s
prohibition on taking “data,” including information stored on removab le
disks and external disk drives?160 The answer is not found in the nature of
computer systems or the endlessly scalable data that they trade in —which
is the focus of Professor Green’s analysis—but in the networks of exchange
that they intersect with, advance, enable, or create. Let us consider digital
books. Some digital books exist for and intersect with social enterprises
that require unrestricted copying, transmittal, and consumption. Take, for

155 Press Release, Pa. House of Representatives, Governor S igns Caltagirone Organized
Retail Theft Bill into Law (June 18, 2010) (on file with Pa. House of Representatives), available
at http://www.pahouse.com/pr/127061810.asp.
156

Id.
NATIONAL RETAIL FEDERATION, 2012 ORGANIZED RETAIL CRIME SURVEY 6 (2012), available
at http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=News&op=viewlive&sp_id=1380 (download
complete survey).
158 We are reminded here o f an episode of the television show Seinfeld in which the main
character, Jerry, told his father that an expensive gift purchased legitimately was bought for
much less on the black market because Jerry believed that his father would both object less to
the extravagance and find some thrill in the possibility of receiving stolen property. Seinfeld:
The Wizard (NBC television broadcast Feb. 26, 1998).
157

159
160

G REEN, supra note 1, at 60-61.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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example, open source websites for the distribution of aca demic work, like
the Social Sciences Research Network (“SSRN”),161 or political
organizations engaged in modern-day pamphleteering.162 For authors of
books lodged on these kinds of websites, unlimited access is the point. Too
many limitations on parties’ access or ability to download copies of their
digital books would, to adopt a phrase from Professor Green, “virtually
negate” the whole value of the enterprise. Consider , by way of contrast, the
author of a novel made available for download through an onl ine vendor
like Amazon.163 Here, unlimited access and downloading “virtually
negates” the Amazonian enterprise as a property regime. In both cases, the
digital books in question retain their non-zero-sumness, but where one
enterprise by definition exploits that characteristic the other must restrict it
or cease to exist. In this developing and often confusing landscape of
twenty-first century property regimes, specialized theft statutes play a
crucial role by marking the line between distinct enterprises and by
clarifying for those who participate in different regimes what conduct does
and does not hold the potential to negate them.
Adopting an enterprise account of theft law also helps to make sense of
grading issues. Contrary to U.S. Attorney Ortiz’s claim in defense of her
indictment of Aaron Swartz, thefts are not all the same. As Green and his
study participants show, both the means and the nature of the property
matter.164 If our enterprise account of theft is right , then there are other
important variables that ought to be included in a moral analysis of theft
severity, which also likely serve to underwrite common intuitions. In
particular, the social importance of a property regime or a property -based
enterprise and the centrality of the norm offended by criminal conduct
should and do play important roles in grading theft offenses. Thus,
unauthorized downloading is less serious than theft by housebreaking
because intellectual property regimes are much less central to our society,
our lives, and our senses of self than personal property regimes —at this
stage at least. We therefore ought to expect that theft by housebreaking
will be punished more severely than unauthorized downloading of a
digital book. Furthermore, an unauthorized dow nload for personal use is
less offensive to intellectual property regimes and commercial online

161

See S OC. S CI. RES. NETWORK, http://www.ssrn.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
See Donald J. Kochan, The Blogosphere and the New Pamphleteers, 11 NEXUS 99, 99-101
(2006) (explaining how the blogosphere enables politically -minded individuals to introduce,
distribute, and debate their political ideals through a vast medium).
162

163 See generally Book Marketer, How Amazon Pricing Affects Author and Publisher Profits,
P UBLETARIAT (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.publetariat.com/?p=942 (explaining that Amazon’s
discount model does not affect author profits).
164

G REEN, supra note 1, at 4-5.
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publishing enterprises than is competitive distribution. We should
therefore expect that specialized theft statutes will reflect these differences
as well.165

CONCLUSION
The foregoing is, of course, a sketch at best. We nevertheless hope that
we have succeeded in making at least a preliminary case for specialized
theft statutes. Although we appreciate Professor Green’s concerns that
these laws can sometimes further clutter already complex criminal codes
without marking any moral distinctions of real significance, these laws
sometimes serve important educative and expressive purposes. They may
be particularly valuable where the target crimes are twenty-first century
thefts. Furthermore, the process of drafting, debating, and passing—or
failing to pass—statutes governing these crimes is almost as critical as the
laws themselves because these conversations provide critical forums for
public discussion about the norms and practices that are essential to our
evolving world of property regimes. The prosecution and tragic death of
Aaron Swartz is such a moment, and demands our careful attention.
Professor Green’s timely and important book has an important role to play
in guiding these conversations, for which we all owe him our thanks.

165 We therefore agree with some of Aaron S wartz’s defenders that his conduct was
relatively innocuous so long as he did not intend to distribute the files he downloaded from
JS TOR. See Alex S tamos, The Truth About Aaron Swartz’s “Crime,” UNHANDLED EXCEPTION (Jan.
12, 2013), http://unhandled.com/2013/01/12/the -truth-about-aaron-swartzs-crime//#comment1313.

